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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The condition known as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (“AIDS”) was 
first reported to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in 1981.2  By 1983, scientists 
had identified a new human retrovirus called HIV or Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus, that was responsible for AIDS.3  Since that time, the number of persons with 
HIV infection and AIDS has grown and HIV/AIDS now effects every country in the 
                                                                
1Clinical Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Albany Law School of Union University; 
B.A. Eastern Illinois University, M.A. State University of New York, J.D. University of 
Houston Law Center 
2See Centers for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonia—Los Angeles, 30 MMWR 
250 (1981); Centers for Disease Control: Kaposi's sarcoma and Pneumocystis pneumonia 
among homosexual men:  New York City and California, 30 MMWR 305 (1981). 
3Joyce W. Hopp & Elizabeth A. Rogers, AIDS and the Allied Health Professions 5-6. 
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world.  In July 1996, an estimated 22 million persons across the world were living 
with HIV infection.4  Medical experts now know that HIV is a progressive disease 
that attacks the body at the outset and even during the Early Disease Stage, or so-
called “asymptomatic stage,” HIV continues to have severe deteriorating physical 
effects.  But during this “asymptomatic” stage, most individuals generally have no 
outward manifestations of the HIV disease.5  This fact raises the issue of whether a 
person with HIV who is asymptomatic can be held to be “disabled” for purposes of 
the protections of the Americans With Disabilities Act. 
Prior to the passage of the ADA in 1990, the term “individual with a handicap” 
had been clearly established under federal disability laws to include all people with 
HIV.  Every reported decision under the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing 
Amendment Act had determined that asymptomatic HIV was protected as a per se 
disability.6  Prior to 1997, only a few Courts had faced the issue of whether a 
plaintiff with asymptomatic HIV was disabled under the ADA.7  In 1997, the Fourth 
and First Circuit Courts of Appeal decided cases in direct conflict with one another, 
opening the door for the U. S. Supreme Court to review the issue of the definition of 
disability under the ADA because of the split created by these Circuit Court 
opinions. 
                                                                
4AIDSCAP/Family Health International, Harvard School of Public Health, The Status and 
Trends of the Global HIV/AIDS Pandemic, July 1996, Vancouver, Canada. 
5J. Kilby & M. Saag, Natural History of HIV-1 Disease, TEXTBOOK OF AIDS MEDICINE 49 
(Merigan, Bartlett, and Bolognesi, Eds. 1999). 
6See Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990)(“[W]e note that it is well 
established that infection with AIDS constitutes a handicap for purposes of the [Rehabilitation 
Act]”); Cain v. Hyatt, 734  F. Supp. at 679 (even when asymptomatic, “... HIV infection 
constitutes a substantial physical limitation upon major life activities”); Baxter v. City of 
Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 725, 728-729 (S.D. Ill. 1989)(finding that HIV–positive persons 
are covered under the Fair Housing Act because they are infectious from first day of 
contracting disease and immunological deterioration begins on first day of becoming infected; 
and finding that the inability to reside in group residence due to public misapprehension about 
HIV adversely affects major life activities); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District, 
662 F. Supp. 376, 376 (CD Cal. 1986) (“Persons infected with the AIDS virus suffer 
significant impairments of their major life activities ... Even those who are asymptomatic have 
abnormalities in their hemic and reproductive systems making procreation and childbirth 
dangerous to themselves and others.”). 
7See e.g. Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994)(person infected with HIV 
virus is an individual with a disability within the meaning of Rehabilitation Act, as in the 
ADA); Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996)(noting that 
ADA regulations define disability to include HIV disease); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston 
Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75(E.D.Tex. 1996); Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 
191 (M.D.Pa. 1995)(“Individuals diagnosed as HIV-positive are considered disabled for 
purposes of the act, whether they are symptomatic or asymptomatic.”); U.S. v. Moruant, 898 
F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (E.D.La. 1995)(“AIDS/HIV-positive are both disabilities under the 
Department of Justice regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA.”); Hoepfl v. Barlow and 
Healthplus, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 317, 319 (E.D.Va. 1995)(“It is now settled law that HIV-
positive individuals are “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.”); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. 
Supp. 110, 111 (D. Utah 1993); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D.Ohio 1994). 
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The two cases, Abbott v. Bragdon8 and Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, 
N.A.9 both involved plaintiffs who were HIV-positive but asymptomatic.  The Abbott 
Court held that asymptomatic HIV was a disability and therefore the plaintiff who 
was seeking dental treatment was protected under the Americans With Disabilities 
Act.10  The Runnebaum Court, on the other hand, took the opposite view and found 
that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA and therefore was 
not protected from the alleged discriminatory firing by his employer.11  This article 
explores the divergent analysis applied to the two cases and then discusses the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott.  Finally, the article discusses what 
questions remain unanswered as a result of the Bragdon v. Abbott decision. 
II.  MEDICAL BACKGROUND OF HIV 
HIV is a human virus that can infect and replicate in numerous types of human 
cells.12  Certain immune-system T-cells, white blood cells contain a surface protein 
known as CD4 and are particularly susceptible to HIV infection.13  Infected T-cells 
(T-cells that are “CD4+”) eventually die, and as the number of such cells decreases, 
the body’s ability to fight infection also decreases.  The infected individual’s CD4+ 
cell count is thus “the best predictive marker of relative risk for developing 
HIV-related opportunistic diseases.14  As a result, HIV disease is viewed as 
progressing in stages that correspond to a level of CD4+ cells or that result in an 
AIDS-defining condition in the patient.15 
HIV disease begins with exposure to and infection by HIV. After infection, HIV 
immediately attacks the cells of the immune system.  HIV attaches to the CD4 
receptor on the surface of a T-cell and its membrane fuses with that of the host cell, 
injecting the viral genetic material into the host T-cell.16  The host cell can then 
become a factory for the production of more copies of HIV’s genetic material, and 
these copies spread to other cells.17  Within two to four weeks after initial infection, 
high levels of circulating HIV can be detected.18  As a result of this attack on the 
cells, HIV infection induces a chronic and progressive process with a broad spectrum 
of manifestations and complications from primary infection to life-threatening 
                                                                
8Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997). 
9Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156(4th Cir. 1997). 
10Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 949. 
11Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 169. 
12Paul A. Volberding, “Clinical Spectrum of HIV Disease,” in AIDS: Etiology, Diagnosis, 
Treatment and Prevention 123, 124 (Vincent T. DeVita, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). 
13Id. 
14Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 49. 
15Id. 
16Hopp & Rogers, supra note 3, at 26-27. 
17Id. 
18Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 53. 
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opportunistic infections.19  There is, in fact, a single, continuous disease process 
beginning with the initial exposure to the infection and terminating in the advanced 
forms of immune deficiency, with death resulting from the complex interactions 
between the HIV infection itself and the secondary opportunistic infections and 
malignancies.20 
HIV disease is categorized by dividing the stages of the illness into five 
categories based CD4 count.  The first stage of HIV disease is known as “acute 
retroviral seroconversion syndrome.”21  Within two to six weeks after initial 
infection, onset of symptoms usually occurs.22  The most common symptoms include 
fevers, chronic abnormal enlargement of the lymph nodes, pharyngitis, and skin rash. 
Laboratory findings include anemia and thrombocytopenia.23  Most symptoms 
diminish within two to three weeks but enlargement of the lymph nodes often 
persists throughout early HIV disease.24 
The second and third stages of HIV disease are known, respectively, as Early 
Stage Disease (CD4 count between 500 and 750 cells/mm3) and Middle Stage 
Disease (CD4 count between 200 and 500 cells/mm3).25  The progression through 
these two relatively asymptomatic stages is the longest interval of HIV disease, with 
a typical duration of 10 years.26  Most individuals in the Early Disease Stage have no 
symptoms related to HIV, other than mild-to-moderate lymphadenopathy 
(enlargement of the lymph nodes) which usually persists from the time of acute 
infection.27  A consistent pattern of irregularities in the blood and immune symptoms 
can also be detected with laboratory tests.28  A range of skin disorders and oral 
lesions often begin in the Early Stage Disease and persist through the Middle Stage.29  
Other mild-to-moderate symptoms may begin to appear during the Middle Stage 
Disease such as fatigue, night sweats, and weight loss.30 
As was noted above, CD4+ cell count is one of the most important markers of the 
disease’s progression. Laboratory evidence demonstrates that CD4 cells decline 
steadily throughout Early Stage Disease.  As HIV continues its attack on the immune 
                                                                
19Maragret Fishl, Introduction to the Clinical Spectrum of AIDS, IN TEXTBOOK OF AIDS 
MEDICINE 139 (Merigan, Bartlett, & Bolognesi, eds. 1999). 
20Id. 
21Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 53. 
22Id. 
23Id.  Thrombocytopenia is a platelet disorder which results in decreased platelet number 
causing a pattern of bleeding.  Merck Manual 1209 (Robert Berkow & Andrew J. Fletcher 
eds., 16th ed. 1992). 
24Id. 
25Id. at 54-55.  
26Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 49. 
27Id. at 54. 
28Id. at 54-55. 
29Id.  
30Mishl, supra note 19 at 142-3. 
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system, a person with HIV experiences a slow, progressive decline in CD4+ cells (an 
average of 40 to 80 cells/mm 3 per year).31  Additionally, it has been demonstrated 
that high levels of viral replication are present even among stable, asymptomatic 
individuals.32  This replication of the virus is present in every organ system in the 
body.  As a result, clinicians recommend antiretroviral therapy to patients even at the 
earliest stage of the disease and constant monitoring of the condition is required.33 
As the CD4+ count drops below 200 cells/mm3, the individual passes from the 
Middle Stage Disease to the Late Stage Disease which the CDC defines as AIDS.34  
Individuals with CD4 counts of less than 50 are in the final stage of AIDS known as 
Advanced HIV Disease.35  Symptomatic HIV disease can range in duration from a 
brief period ending in death to a number of years.  Symptoms at this stage include 
night sweats, chronic diarrhea, fever, weight loss, fatigue, and more frequent or 
severe skin and oral lesions.36  “Nearly every organ system in the body can be 
affected,” and “the effect of symptoms on the patient ranges from minimal to 
devastating.”37  When an individual with HIV reaches the final stages of the disease, 
CD4+ cells fall below 200 cells/mm3 and continue to decline.  Opportunistic 
infections such as pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, encephalitis, and B-cell 
lymphoma begin to appear38  When CD4+ counts drop below 50 cells/mm 3, an 
increasing array of opportunistic infections must be treated.39  Neurological disease 
processes become especially prevalent including central nervous system lymphoma 
and dementia.  Involuntary weight loss, or “wasting,” are also common at this 
stage.40 
With aggressive antiretroviral therapy and prophylactic treatments designed to 
fend off opportunistic infections, the late stage of HIV disease can be managed for 
some time despite the profound immunosuppression brought about by HIV.41  
Recently, the incidence of AIDS-related deaths at this late stage of HIV disease 
declined, suggesting that “advancements in treatment are extending the lives of the 
most immunosupppressed HIV-infected patients”.42  However, death is still the 
expected occurrence at this stage of HIV disease and often death occurs because of 
an inability to control the opportunistic infections which the body cannot fight off.43 
                                                                
31Id. at 141; Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 55. 
32Id. at 54. 
33Id. at 55; Mishl, supra note 19 at 142, 145-6. 
34Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 55. 
35Id. at 56. 
36Mishl, supra note 19 at 142, Table 10.5.   
37Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 55-6. 
38Id. at 56. 
39Id.  
40Id. 
41Id. at 56-57. 
42Kilby & Saag, supra note 5 at 56. 
43Id. at 56-57. 
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In addition to the physical attack on the immune system, HIV infection creates 
serious mental health problems even in the earliest “asymptomatic” stage of the 
disease.44  Persons living with HIV/AIDS may experience the same psychological 
reaction as those experienced by other terminally ill patients–disbelief, denial, 
numbness, anger, depression and suicidal ideation.45  Yet unlike other terminal 
illnesses, such as cancer, a diagnosis of AIDS carries with it stigmatization and 
disapproval of a whole society.  This disapproval often results in social ostracism 
and discrimination that create additional psychological stress.46  In addition to its 
effect on the psychology of patients, in the later stages of the disease most patients 
experience some cognitive and affective changes related to HIV infection of the 
brain.  Differentiating between the effects of anxiety and depression on cognition and 
the effects of neurological problems on cognition is difficult but may be crucial to 
proper diagnosis, intervention and therapy.47 
The mental health problems that are commonly experienced by persons living 
with AIDS include depression and anxiety, adjustment disorder, panic disorders, 
delirium and dementia.48  Except for the last two, these problems exist in even the 
earliest stages of the HIV disease progression. 
Given the reality of HIV disease, the issue is whether HIV, even in its earliest 
stages, meets the definition of disability for purposes of the ADA. 
III.  DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
A.  Statutory Definition 
The ADA defines disability as follows:  “the term ‘disability’ means, with respect 
to an individual (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; 
or (C) being regarded as having such impairment.”49  These definitions can be argued 
in the alternative.50 
The first definition requires that one prove three basic elements in order to show 
that the plaintiff is protected by the ADA because of his or her disability.  First, one 
must prove the existence of an impairment.  Second, a major life activity must be 
                                                                
44One study found that persons diagnosed with HIV experienced significantly higher 
levels of depression, anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive behavior than before their diagnosis.  
Ostrow, Joseph, Kessler, et al, Disclosure of HIV Antibody Status:  Behavioral and Mental 
Health Correlates, 1 AIDS EDUCATION AND PREVENTION 1 (1989); See generally, Hopp & 
Rogers, supra note 3, at 134-145; Mukand, J. Rehabilitation for Patients with HIV Disease 
(McGraw-Hill: New York, 1991) pp.234-238; MARK G. WINORSKI, AIDS-RELATED 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 72-85 (1991). 
45Mukand, supra note 44 at 218. 
46Id. at p.221. 
47Id. at p.230. 
48See Mukand, supra note 44, at 218-223; WINIORSKI, supra note 44, at 72-85; Hopp & 
Rogers, supra note 3, at 134-145. 
4942 U.S.C. Sec. 12102(2) 
50Id. 
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affected by the impairment.  Finally, there must be a substantial limitation on the 
major life activity because of the impairment.  The terms “impairment,” “major life 
activity,” and “substantial limitation” are not specifically defined in the statute but 
have been defined in the regulations promulgated to implement the ADA.51 
The second definition of disability allows an individual to seek protection of the 
ADA if the person can show that he or she has a record or history of an impairment 
that at one time substantially limited a major life activity.52  This provision attempts 
to protect people with a history of a disability such as individuals who have a history 
of cancer or mental illness. 
The third definition of disability is designed to protect individuals from the myths 
and fears associated with disabilities.  An individual will be protected under this 
third definition if the individual has an impairment that does not substantially limit 
their activities but the individual is treated as if he or she has a limitation or if the 
limitation exists because of the attitudes of others toward the impairment.53  For 
example, if an employer refuses to hire a person because of a facial deformity, that 
individual may be protected under the ADA. 
B.  Administrative Regulations under the ADA  
Congress gave the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
authority under 42 U.S.C. Section 12116 to issue regulations with respect to Title I 
of the ADA, the subchapter regarding employment.54  Congress gave the Justice 
Department the authority to issue regulations with respect to Title II, the subchapter 
dealing with discrimination in places of public accommodation.55  The fact that the 
different agencies were promulgating two sets of regulations defining disability may 
have lead to inconsistent definitions.  The regulations and guidelines promulgated by 
these two agencies must be given deference by courts in interpreting the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.56 
The EEOC has issued extensive regulations defining the terms used in Title I of 
the ADA (relating to employment discrimination) including the term “physical or 
mental impairment.”  Although the EEOC regulations do not specifically refer to 
HIV, they do include in the definition of impairment a “physiological disorder, or 
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the 
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, 
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, 
                                                                
51See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104; 29 C.F.R. 1630.2. 
5229 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k); See also Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 
1322 (E.D.Pa. 1994) the Court held that a “record of impairment” meant that the proponent 
had to show a history of an impairment that led directly to the facts that gave rise to the 
litigation. 
5328 C.F.R. § 36.104; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. 
5442 U.S.C. § 12132. 
5542 U.S.C. § 12182. 
56See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that 
administrative guidelines that are promulgated by an explicit congressional grant must be 
given “controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”)  Id. at 844. 
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genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.”57  While HIV is not 
specifically referred to in the EEOC regulations, as described in the above section, 
HIV attacks the hemic and lymphatic systems as soon as it enters the body and 
immediately begins to replicate itself and kill CD4 cells.  Therefore, HIV should 
constitute a “disorder” affecting the hemic and lymphatic systems. 
“Major life activities” are defined in the EEOC regulations as “functions such as 
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working.”58  A person is substantially limited if they are 
“unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general 
population can perform,”59 and the factors that should be considered in making this 
determination are “(i) the nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) the duration or 
the expected duration of the impairment, and (iii) the permanent or long term impact, 
or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the 
impairment.”60 
The Justice Department regulations implementing Title III (discrimination in 
places of public accommodation) contain the same definition of “major life 
activities”61 and “impairment” as found in the EEOC regulations62 but also further 
provides that: 
the phrase “physical or mental impairment’ includes, but is not limited to, 
such contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions as orthopedic, 
visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, 
muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, 
mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV 
disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug 
addiction, and alcoholism.63 
Furthermore, the Justice Department regulations conclude that “asymptomatic 
HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, either 
because of its actual effect on the individual with the disease or because the reactions 
of other people to individuals with HIV disease cause such individuals to be treated 
as disabled.”64 
                                                                
5729 CFR § 1630.2(h)(1). 
5829 CFR § 1630.2 (i). 
5929 CFR § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). 
6029 CFR § 1630.2(j)(2). 
6128 C.F.R. § 36.104. 
62See 28 CFR § 36.104(1)(i). 
6329 CFR § 36.104(1)(i)(B)(2); 28 CFR 36.104(a). 
6428 C.F.R. § 36.104, App. B  (Department of Justice) (“The phrase physical or mental 
impairment includes ... HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic) ....”);   In 
addition to the Department of Justice, other agencies have been equally clear about whether 
HIV is a disability by directly including HIV infection in their interpretation of “impairment.”  
See e.g. 29 C.F.R. § 34.2 (Department of Labor); 34 C.F.R. § 1200.103 (National Council on 
Disability); 7 C.F.R. § 15e.103 (Department of Agriculture); 45 C.F.R. § 2301.103 (Arctic 
Research Commission ); 24 C.F.R. § 100, Subch. A, App. I § 100.201 (Department of 
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Thus, the regulations promulgated for the relevant titles of the ADA all support a 
finding that “asymptomatic HIV” is a disability deserving the protections of the 
ADA. 
C.  Legislative History 
Another source to look to in determining whether “asymptomatic” HIV disease is 
a disability for purposes of the ADA is the legislative history of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.  The Supreme Court has held that it is proper to look to legislative 
history for guidance in determining the intent of Congress if there is ambiguity in the 
interpretation of statutory language.65  Even when “the language of the statute is 
clear, any lingering doubt as to its proper construction may be resolved by examining 
the legislative history.”66 
On its face, the legislative history of the ADA indicates Congress’ intent to 
include individuals with asymptomatic HIV, per se, in the class of people protected 
by the ADA.  The Congressional Record, House and Senate Committee Reports and 
a Justice Department memorandum issued in response to the issue of HIV and the 
ADA all expressly support this proposition.  However, there is also support for the 
proposition that while asymptomatic HIV can be shown to be a disability, if the 
elements are proven, Congress did not intend for it to be a disability per se. 
The Supreme Court has held that official committee reports are the “authoritative 
source for finding the Legislature’s intent.”67  Committee reports from both the 
House and Senate clearly state that infection with the HIV virus should be 
considered an impairment within the meaning of the ADA: 
It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions, 
diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments . . . The 
term includes, however, such conditions, diseases and infections as . . . infection with 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus.68 
However, while it seems clear that Congress intended HIV to qualify as an 
impairment under the ADA, it is less clear whether Congress intended 
“asymptomatic” HIV to be a per se disability.  Physical and mental impairments are 
not protected disabilities unless and until they also substantially limit a major life 
activity.  The official House Report to the ADA in a section titled “Explanation of 
the Legislation–Definition of the Term Disability” appears to find that HIV is a per 
se disability.  As that report states: 
                                                          
Housing and Urban Development) (adding HIV infection to list of physical and mental 
impairments). 
65See Green v. Beck Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 508 (1989)(concluding that “if 
the text is ambiguous, we seek guidance from the legislative history”); United States v. Irvin, 2 
F.3d 72, 76-77(4th Cir. 1993)(“Because the relevant statutory language is susceptible to 
interpretations other than the one suggested by the Government and is therefore ambiguous, 
we turn to the legislative history for assistance in ascertaining the intent of Congress.”). 
66See United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 561 (1982). 
67Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,76 (1984). 
68H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333.  Part three 
of the House Report reiterates inclusion of HIV as an impairment.  See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, 
pt. 3, at 28, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451.  
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[A] person who is a paraplegic will have a substantial difficulty in the 
major life activity of walking; a deaf person will have a substantial 
difficulty in hearing aural communications; and a person with lung 
disease will have a substantial limitation in the major life activity of 
breathing.  As noted by the U.S. Department of Justice ... a person 
infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the 
first prong of the definition of the term “disability” because of a 
substantial limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relationships.69 
The House Report stands for the proposition that HIV infection, regardless of the 
manifestation of symptoms, is not only an “impairment” but is a “disability” 
protected by the ADA because of the assumption that procreation and intimate 
sexual relationships are major life activities that are substantially limited once a 
person is infection with the AIDS virus, regardless of the stage of that infection.70 
On the other hand, the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee Report on 
the definition of disability under the ADA (the “ADA Senate Report”) states: 
“It is the Committee’s intent that the analysis of the term ‘individual with 
handicaps’ ... by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
[HUD] of the regulations implementing the Fair Housing Amendments 
Act of 1988 apply to the definition of the term ‘disability’ included in this 
legislation.”71 
The HUD regulations implementing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 
specifically discuss the question of whether persons infected with HIV “are 
understood to be persons with a ‘handicap’ protected by the Act.”72  The HUD 
                                                                
69See H. Rep–2 at 52.  See also, S. Rep. at 22;  H. Rep.–3 at 28 n. 18 (reaching the 
identical conclusion).  The House Report expressly adopted a 1988 official legal memorandum 
of the Department of Justice which concluded that asymptomatic HIV was a disability under 
the Rehabilitation Act.  The Preamble to the ADA Title III regulations cites and adopts this 
1988 DOJ Memorandum which concludes that people with asymptomatic HIV are covered 
under the Rehabilitation Act, because HIV substantially limits the major life activities of 
procreation and intimate sexual relations.  See 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. B Section 36.104. 
70Though remarks made by House members do not carry the weight of the official 
Committee Reports, it is clear from remarks made by several members of the House that they 
believed the ADA would make HIV a per se disability.  For example, Representative Waxman 
stated:  “People with HIV disease are those who have the spectrum of the disease–from 
asymptomatic HIV infection, to symptomatic HIV infection, to full-blown AIDS . . . All such 
individuals are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability in the ADA.”  136 
Cong. Rec. H4626 (daily ed. July 12, 1990); See also 136 Cong. Rec. H2626 (daily ed. May 
22, 1990)(remarks of Rep. McDermott)(“I am particularly pleased that this act will finally also 
extend necessary protection to people with HIV disease.  These are individuals who have any 
condition along the full spectrum of HIV infection–asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic 
HIV infection, or full-blown AIDS.”); 136 Cong. Rec. H4623 (daily ed. July 12, 
1990)(remarks of Rep. Owens)(“As I noted, the ADA will offer critical protection to people 
with HIV disease in a range of areas.  People with HIV disease are individuals who have any 
condition along the full spectrum of HIV infection–asymptomatic HIV infection, symptomatic 
HIV infection, or full-blown AIDS,”).  
71S. Rep. No. 101–116, 101 st Cong., 1 st Sess. 21 (1989). 
7254 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3245 (Jan. 23, 1989).  
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regulations refer to the holding in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline73 and to 
many statements in the 1988 Act's legislative history indicating that HIV–infected 
persons are protected.  “In light of these authorities,” HUD says, it “has added [HIV] 
to the illustrative list of ‘physical or mental impairments’ in the final rule's definition 
of handicap.”74  “Physical or mental impairments” are distinct from “handicaps” in 
the 1988 Act’s definition of “handicap”75 just as “physical or mental impairments” 
are distinct from “disabilities” in the ADA’s definition of “disability.76  Physical or 
mental impairments of any kind are not handicaps or disabilities unless and until they 
also substantially limit a major life activity.  The HUD analysis, therefore, stops 
short of defining HIV as a per se handicap.  HUD recognizes HIV as an impairment, 
but not automatically as a handicap.  The ADA Senate Report explicitly endorses 
this HUD analysis.  According to this legislative history, HIV infection is not per se 
a disability, but rather one example among many of a physical impairment that may, 
in appropriate circumstances, trigger a finding of a disability. 
Like the ADA Senate Report, the ADA House Education and Labor Committee, 
Judiciary Committee, and Energy and Commerce Committee Reports all explicitly 
endorse the HUD analysis which recognizes HIV as an impairment, but not as a 
disability or handicap.  The Education and Labor Committee Report states:  “It is the 
Committee’s intent that the analysis of the term 'individual with handicaps’ ... by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development of the regulations implementing the 
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 apply to the definition of the term 'disability' 
included in this legislation.”77  Like the ADA Senate Report, these sources of 
legislative history also treat HIV as an impairment that may trigger a disability, but 
do not teat HIV as a disability per se. 
Therefore, taken as a whole, it seems clear that legislative history supports the 
proposition that Congress intended that HIV to qualify as an “impairment,” but not 
necessarily as a per se disability. 
                                                                
73See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (holding that a person 
with a contagious disease is an “individual with a disability” for purposes of the Rehabilitation 
Act, assuming the disease substantially limits a major life activity and the person is “otherwise 
qualified”–i.e. there is no direct threat the health and safety of others).  
7424 C.F.R. § 100.201. 
7542 U.S.C. § 3602(h). 
7642 U.S.C. § 12102(2). 
77H. Rep. No. 101–485(II), 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332. The Judiciary Committee Report states that the “Committee intends 
that the analysis of ... the term ‘handicap’ contained in the primary regulations implementing 
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, apply to the definition of ‘disability’ in the 
ADA.”  H. Rep. No. 101–485(III), 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. 26–27, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449.  The Energy and Commerce Committee Report states that the 
definition of disability in the ADA is intended to have “the same meanings given to the 
corresponding provisions used in the definition of ... the term ‘handicaps’ in section 802(h) of 
the Fair Housing Act, and in regulations issued under those statutes.”  H. Rep. No. 101–
485(IV), 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 525. 
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IV.  THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS IN ABBOTT AND RUNNEBAUM 
Between 1990 when the ADA was passed and 1997 when Abbott v. Bragdon and 
Runnebaum v. NationsBank were decided, several lower Courts and two circuits had 
held that HIV infection was a disability,78 while the Fourth Circuit held it was not 
per se a disability.79  The Abbott and Runnebaum cases brought attention to this split 
in opinion when the two cases were inconsistently decided in 1997. 
In March of 1997, the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s 
decision that asymptomatic HIV was a per se disability under the ADA in an non-
employment context. 80  In the Abbott case, Ms. Abbott sought dental treatment from 
Dr. Bragdon.  At her first examination she made it known to the dentist that she was 
HIV-positive.  At the time of the appointment she not exhibiting any outward 
symptoms of HIV disease.81  Dr. Bragdon told her she needed to have a cavity filled 
but he was not willing to treat her in his office.  He offered to perform the work at a 
hospital with no added fee for his services, though she would have been responsible 
for the hospital fees.82  Ms. Abbott refused Dr. Bragdon’s offer and filed an action 
under Title III of the ADA alleging discrimination on the basis of her disability. 
In August of 1997, the Fourth Circuit once again held that asymptomatic HIV 
was not a disability under the ADA.  In Runnebaum v. NationsBank 83 the Circuit 
Court of Appeals reviewed a claim filed pursuant to Title I of the ADA in which an 
asymptomatic HIV-positive man was fired after his employer learned he was HIV-
positive.  In that case, Runnebaum who had been diagnosed with HIV in 1988 but 
who was asymptomatic, was hired by NationsBank to work as a marketing 
coordinator in the private banking department.84  Documentation indicated that 
Runnebaum had some difficulties on the job and in June 1992 he was transferred to 
the trust department to work in a sales position.85  Runnebaum’s new supervisor set 
                                                                
78See e.g. Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994)(person infected with HIV 
virus is individual with a disability within the meaning of Rehabilitation Act, as in the ADA); 
Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996)(noting that ADA 
regulations define disability to include HIV AIDS disease); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston 
Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-75 (E.D. Tex. 1996); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. 
Supp. 1310, 1321 (E.D.Pa. 1994); Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D.Pa. 
1995)(Individuals diagnosed as HIV-positive are considered disabled for purposes of the act, 
whether they are symptomatic or “asymptomatic.”); U.S. v. Morant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 
(E.D.La. 1995)(“AIDS/HIV-positive are both disabilities under the Department of Justice 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA.”); Hoepfl v. Barlow and Healthplus, Inc., 906 
F. Supp. 317, 319, n.7 (E.D.Va. 1995)(“It is now settled law that HIV-positive individuals are 
“disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.”); T.E.P. v. Leavitt, 840 F. Supp. 110,111 (D. 
Utah 1993); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D.Ohio 1994). 
79Ennis v.Natioinal Ass’n of Bus. and Educational Radio, 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995). 
80Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 942. 
81Id., 107 F.3d at 937. 
82Id. at 93. 
83123 F.3d 156. 
84Id. at 161. 
85Id. 
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out in writing certain sales goals that she expected Runnebaum to meet.86 In 
September 1992, Runnebaum went to a gay bar with his former supervisor, 
NationsBank’s Senior Managing Officer, and at the bar disclosed his HIV status.87  
Sometime in November 1992, Runnebaum placed a prescription order for AZT 
which was paid for by the bank's health plan.  The AZT was delivered to Runnebaum 
at work and on at least two occasions they were inadvertently opened by bank 
personnel.88  
By November 1992, Runnebaum’s supervisor, Ann Pettit, had become displeased 
with his job performance because he had not met his sales goals.  However, she 
decided to give him an opportunity to “redeem himself” and assigned him the 
responsibility for planning and hosting a holiday reception that was important to the 
bank.  In addition, she reduced the sales goals set out in her earlier memorandum.89  
Pettit learned in late November or early December that Runnebaum was HIV-
positive.  On January 12, 1993 Pettit fired Runnebaum claiming that he failed to 
complete assignments and failed to present a professional image.90  He filed a 
complaint with the EEOC and then filed suit in Federal District Court claiming that 
NationsBank had violated his rights under the Americans With Disabilities Act in 
that he had been terminated because he was HIV-positive.91 
Defendants in both the Abbott and Runnebaum cases claimed plaintiffs were not 
within the protections of the ADA because they were not disabled under the meaning 
of the statute.92  Both Courts examined each of the elements of the first definition of 
disability, and on each issue reached conflicting decisions. 
A.  Is Early Stage HIV an “Impairment?” 
Until 1997, most Courts had not seriously questioned that HIV infection is a 
physical impairment under federal disability discrimination laws.93  The Abbott Court 
                                                                
86Id. 
87Id. at 162. 
88Runnenbaum, 123 F.3d at 162. 
89Id. 
90Id. at 163. 
91Id. 
92See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 939; See Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 
165. 
93Virtually every court since the passage of the ADA has found that HIV is a disability.  
See, e.g., Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 939-942 (1st Cir.1997); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 
1439, 1445 (9th Cir.1994); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1524 (11th Cir.1991); Severino 
v. North Fort Myers Fire Control District, 935 F.2d 1179, 1181(11th Cir.1991); Doe v. 
Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1458 (11th Cir.1990); Hernandez v. Prudential Insurance Company of 
America, 977 F. Supp. 1160, 1163-1165 (M.D.Fla.1997); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston 
Store of Delaware, 924 F. Supp. 763, 774-777 (E.D.Tex.1996); D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 
166, 170 (D.N.J.1995); Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D.Pa.1995); Austin v. 
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1465 (E.D.Pa.1995); Howe v. Hull, 
873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D.Ohio 1994); United States v. Morvant, F. Supp. 1093-94 
(E.D.La.1994); Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Systems, 892 F. Supp. 176, 179 
(E.D.Mich.1994), aff’d mem., 86 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir.1996); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, 862 F. 
192 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 14:179 
held “unhesitatingly that HIV-positive status, simpliciter, whether symptomatic or 
asymptomatic comprises a physical impairment under the ADA.”94  The Court based 
its decision on EEOC regulations95 which explicitly support this conclusion and cited 
to cases which “buttressed” the conclusion.96 
In Runnebaum, however, the plurality equated “impairment” with “visible 
“symptom.”  The Runnebaum Court found that if no symptoms were manifesting 
themselves then there could be not diminishing effects on the individual.97  Though 
nothing in the text of the statute or in the legislative history was shown to support a 
requirement that an impairment had to be visible or outwardly manifest, the 
Runnebaum Court found that asymptomatic HIV was not an impairment. 
The Court first outlined its duty to interpret the statute and found that “whether 
asymptomatic HIV infection is an impairment is first and foremost a question of 
statutory interpretation.”98  The Court noted that if the language of the statute is plain 
and unambiguous, then no duty of interpretation arises and the sole function of the 
Courts is to enforce the statute as written.99  The Court added that when a word is not 
defined in the statute it should be construed in accordance with its ordinary and 
natural meaning.100  Since the term “impairment” was not defined in the statute, the 
Court looked to Webster's dictionary for a definition of the ordinary meaning of the 
term.  Webster’s defined “impairment” as a “decrease in strength, value, amount, or 
quality.”101  Based on that definition, the Court found that asymptomatic HIV was 
not an impairment.  “Without symptoms, there are no diminishing effects on the 
individual.”102 
The Runnebaum Court found that since the ordinary meaning of the term 
“impairment” was clear and unambiguous, there was no authority to turn to the 
                                                          
Supp. 1310, 1319-1322 (E.D.Pa.1994); Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS, Inc. v. 
Village of Waterford, 808 F. Supp. 120, 129-132 (N.D.N.Y.1992); Stewart B. McKinney 
Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Commission of Fairfield, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1209 
(D.Conn.1992); Doe v. District of Columbia, 796 F. Supp. 559, 567 n. 10 (D.D.C. 1992); 
Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (D.Az. 1991). 
94Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 939. 
95See 28 CFR 36.104 (stating that the phrase physical impairment “includes . . . HIV 
disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic). . .” 
96The Court cites Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994), a case decided 
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which held that there is no distinction to be made, for 
purposes of the Act, between an individual with full-blown AIDS and one with asymptomatic 
HIV.  The Abbott court also cited Doe v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. 
den, 499 U.S.. 904 (1991), also decided under the Rehabilitation Act, which noted that “it is 
well established that infection with AIDS constitutes a handicap for purposes of the Act.” 
97Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 168. 
98Id. at 167. 
99Id. 
100Id., citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054 (1993). 
101Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary 1131 (1986). 
102Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 167. 
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legislative history.103  However, the Court commented that the Committee Reports do 
not make it clear that asymptomatic HIV is per se an impairment and declined to 
consider the floor statements made by Sen. Kennedy and Representatives 
McDermott, Waxman, and Owens declaring that the collective intent of the 535-
member Congress could not be ascertained by the comments of four members.104 
The Runnebaum Court held that “[T]he plain meaning of “impairment” suggests 
that asymptomatic HIV infection will never qualify as an impairment: by definition 
asymptomatic HIV infection exhibits no diminishing effects on the individual.”105  
Since Runnebaum produced no evidence showing any diminishing effects as a result 
of his HIV, the Court found he did not meet the definition of "impairment" and 
should not be afforded the protections of the ADA. 
B.  What Major Life Activity is Affected? 
With respect to the second issue, both plaintiffs alleged that their HIV infection 
had a profound impact on their ability to have children and to engage in normal 
sexual activities.  Both Courts, therefore, reviewed whether reproduction and 
maintaining intimate sexual relationships constituted major life activities 
The Abbott Court found that since the statute did not define the term “major life 
activity” it would use the dictionary to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the term.106  
As the Court stated: 
The plain meaning of the word “major” denotes comparative importance.  
These definitions strongly suggest that the touchstone for determining an 
activity’s inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance—and 
reproduction, which is both the source of all life and one of life's most 
important activities, easily qualifies under that criterion.107 
The Abbott Court also looked to the regulations and found that reproduction “fit 
comfortably within its sweep.”108  The EEOC regulations specifically refer to 
disorders affecting reproduction as being within the purview of the protection of the 
ADA.  Therefore, the Court found that the regulations supported a finding that 
reproduction is a major life activity: 
Reproduction (and the bundle of activities that it encompasses) constitutes a 
major life activity because of its singular importance to those who engage in it, both 
in terms of its significance in their lives and in terms of its relation to their 
                                                                
103See Puerto Rico Dep’t of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 501 
(1988) (stating that “unenacted approvals, beliefs, and desires are not laws”); Pittston Coal 
Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115, 109 S. Ct. 414, 420–21, 102 L.Ed.2d 408 (1988) 
(rejecting argument that legislative history at issue limited general statutory language).  
104Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 169. 
105Id. 
106Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F. 3d at 939. 
107See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1084 (3d 
ed.1992) (listing “greater than others in importance or rank” as the initial definition of 
“major”); Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 718 (1989) (defining “major” as 
“greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest”).  
108Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 940. 
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day-to-day existence.  Mindful of this reality, and honoring what we believe to be 
Congress’ intent, we hold that reproduction is a major life activity within the 
meaning of the ADA.109 
The Runnebaum Court agreed that reproduction was a “fundamental human 
activity” but refused to find that it was a major life activity for purposes of the ADA.  
Once again, looking to the dictionary definition for guidance, the Runnebaum Court 
found the word “major” to mean “demanding great attention or concern.”110  Based 
on this definition of “major,” the Court found that the definition suggested that not 
all life activities were covered, and that those activities which were relatively less 
significant than others would not qualify.  The Court was “unconvinced” that 
“engaging in intimate sexual relations falls within the statutory rubric of the major 
life activities.111 
Though neither Court definitively decided the issue, both Courts discussed 
whether there must be a showing that the major life activity is an activity that is 
significant in general or whether life activity must be shown to have particular 
significance to the individual.  In both the Abbott and Runnebaum cases, the issue 
was whether the plaintiff must show that his or her own ability or decision to 
procreate was significantly affected by the disability and not just that, in general, 
procreation is affected by asymptomatic HIV infection.112 
Both Courts agreed that the ADA requires an individualized inquiry on a case-
by-case basis as to whether the plaintiff's impairment qualifies as a “disability” under 
the Act.113  Both Courts also seem to agree that the need for the case by case analysis 
does not necessarily require a corresponding case-by-case inquiry into the 
connection between the plaintiff and the major life activity.114  Once it is shown that 
reproduction is a major life activity, an individual plaintiff must show only that he or 
she is substantially limited in reproduction and not that reproduction is of particular 
importance to them individually.  However, neither court reached the specific 
question as to whether the significance of the activity must be individualized or 
general.  Abbott found reproduction and sexual activity is of “singular importance” 
and therefore did constitute a “major life activity”115 while Runnebaum found that 
                                                                
109Id. at 941. 
110Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, supra n. 99 at 718. 
111Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 170. 
112Id. at 169; Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 941. 
113Id. 
114Abbott, 107 F.3d at 941(Although it is true that analysis under the first subset of the 
ADA’s definition of disability–“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more of the major life activities of [the plaintiff]”–calls for an individualized inquiry into 
whether the plaintiff is disabled), see 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j) (noting in the 
context of the ADA’s employment discrimination regulations that “[s]ome impairments may 
be disabling for particular individuals but not for others”); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 
32 (1st Cir. 1996); Ennis v. National Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 55 F.3d 55, 59 (4th 
Cir. 1995)(the need for this case-by-case analysis of disability does not necessarily require a 
corresponding case-by-case inquiry into the connection between the plaintiff and the major life 
activity.”).  
115Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 942. 
1999-2000] IS HIV A DISABILITY 195 
reproduction and sexual activity were not significant and therefore do not constitute 
“major life activities.”116 
C.  What Constitutes Substantial Limitation? 
Once it has been shown that there is an impairment and a major life activity 
which is affected by that impairment, it must still be shown that the impairment 
results in a substantial limitation of the major life activity.   
The Abbott Court reviewed the medical evidence which indicated that an 
HIV-positive pregnant woman faces an approximately 25% risk of transmitting the 
virus to her child without AZT therapy and an 8% risk of viral transmission with 
such therapy.117  In the Court’s opinion “no reasonable juror could conclude that an 
8% risk of passing an incurable, debilitating, and inevitably fatal disease to one’s 
child is not a substantial restriction on reproductive activity.”118  Based on the 
medical evidence the Court determined that HIV-positive status is a physical 
impairment that substantially limits a woman's major life activity of reproduction.119 
Though the Runnebaum Court, had already determined that procreation was not a 
major life activity, the Court still considered the question as to what degree of 
limitation Runnebaum suffered in the event that procreation was found to be a major 
life activity. Assuming that procreation was a major life activity, the Runnebaum 
Court found that the plaintiff could not show that his ability to procreate was 
impacted by his HIV.  The Court found that an individual may make a lifestyle 
choice as a result of being infected with HIV and may decide not to have children, 
but nothing inherent in the infection prevents him or her from having a child.  The 
Court held: 
We hold that asymptomatic HIV does not substantially limit procreation 
or intimate sexual relations for purposes of the ADA. . . . nothing inherent 
in the infection actually prevents either procreation or intimate relations.  
Asymptomatic HIV–infected individuals are able to, and indeed do, 
procreate and engage in sexual intimacies.  We recognize that as a 
behavioral matter, asymptomatic HIV–infected individuals may refrain 
from having children or engaging in sexual relations “because of concerns 
that the offspring or partner will be infected with the virus.”  But as a 
physical matter, nothing inherent in the virus substantially limits 
procreation or intimate sexual relations.  The statutory language is plain: 
the impairment in question, not the individual’s reaction to the 
impairment, must “substantially limit[ ] one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2)(A).  This language 
                                                                
116Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 171-2. 
117Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 942. 
118Id. 
119The court was careful to hold that HIV substantially limited a woman's reproductive 
activity.  Since there is no transmission of the virus from father to fetus, it remains an open 
question as to whether the court would find a similar limitation in reproduction for a male 
plaintiff. 
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requires a causal nexus between the physical effect of the impairment and 
one of the major life activities.120 
The conflicting Abbott and Runnebaum decisions leave every element set out in 
the first prong of the disability definition of the ADA in question.  As a result, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Abbott case to decide the split in these 
decisions. 
V.  THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN BRAGDON V. ABBOTT 
On November 26, 1997 the United States Supreme Court granted the Petition for 
Certiorari filed by attorneys for Dr. Bragdon, the defendant in the Abbott v. Bragdon 
case.  For the first time, the high Court agreed to decide issues central to the AIDS 
pandemic.121  In announcing its decision to hear the appeal of Abbott v. Bragdon, the 
Court asked the parties to address three issues:  (1) Do people with asymptomatic 
HIV have a disability per se under the ADA? (2) Is reproduction a major life activity 
within the meaning of the ADA? (3) Should Courts defer to the health-care 
provider's reasonable professional judgement as to whether a patient with an 
infectious disease poses a direct threat to the provider's own health or safety?122 
On June 26, 1998 the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, affirmed the lower 
court decision that Ms. Abbott met the definition of a disabled person under the first 
prong of the ADA definition of disability.  However, the court left open several 
questions, among them the critical question as to whether asymptomatic HIV is a 
disability per se–i.e. is asymptomatic HIV an impairment, that by its very nature, 
always substantially limits a major life activity?  
A.  Is Asymptomatic HIV an “Impairment”? 
Dr. Bragdon and Ms. Abbott did not substantially disagree as to whether HIV, 
whether symptomatic or asymptomatic, is a physical impairment.  However, Dr. 
Bragdon argued that, based on regulatory and legislative history and a plain reading 
of the statute, there was no basis for holding that HIV was a disability per se.123  
However, there was no serious attempt to argue that HIV is not an impairment for 
purposes of the ADA.124 
                                                                
120Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d at 172. 
121See Michael Closen, The Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of AIDS: Denial of 
Certiorari in HIV-AIDS Cases and its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61(4) ALB. L. REV. 
897 (1998).  As Dr. Closen points out, on more than 25 occasions since 1987, the Supreme 
Court has refused to grant writs of certiorari in HIV-AIDS cases. 
122Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2200 (1998).  
123See Petitioner’s Brief, 1998 WL 4678 at 19. 
124As the petitioner, Dr. Bragdon argued in his brief, it was Congress’ intent to apply the 
definitions set forth in HUD regulations to the definition of “disability” under the ADA. S. 
Rep. No. 101-116, 101 st Cong., 1 st Sess. 21 (1989).  In 1989, HUD added HIV to the 
illustrative list of “physical or mental impairments” in the final rule's definition of handicap. 
See 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3245 (Jan. 23, 1989).  HUD regulations recognize HIV as an 
impairment, but not as a handicap per se.  See Petitioner's Brief, supra n. 122 at 19-20. 
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Since it was essentially uncontested, the Supreme Court easily held that HIV 
infection is an impairment per se for purposes of the ADA.125  The Court based its 
finding on regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and on medical evidence 
about the disease itself.  Interestingly, the court did not rely on EEOC regulations or 
Department of Justice regulations promulgated under the ADA itself.  Those 
regulations specifically include in the definition of disability “. . . HIV disease 
(whether symptomatic or asymptomatic) . . .”126  
The Court found that the ADA specifically provided in the statute that nothing in 
the ADA “shall be construed to apply a lesser standard that the standards applied 
under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790, et. seq.) or the 
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.”127  Therefore, the court 
looked to the regulations issued pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act by the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare in 1977.  Though those regulations did not 
specifically refer to HIV, the Court reasoned that HIV had not yet been “discovered” 
as a disease and therefore would not have been included.  However, based on 
medical evidence, the court found that “HIV infection does fall well within the 
general definition set forth by the regulations.”128 
HIV infection is an incurable disease which, even before the onset of outward 
signs of illness, causes deterioration of the body’s ability to fight infections from 
many sources.129  HIV creates abnormalities and deficiencies in the blood and 
immune systems.130  When HIV enters the body, it multiplies and has an immediate 
and destructive effect on the blood (hemic) and lymphatic systems, which are critical 
to the body’s defense against infection.131  Thus, even before the onset of overt 
symptoms, HIV infection causes a progressive destruction of the body’s blood, 
lymphatic and immune systems, diminishing the body’s capacity to fight 
infections.132  The Court found that the term “asymptomatic phase” is a misnomer 
because clinical features persist from the very beginning of the infection including 
swollen lymph nodes, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial 
infections.133 
In finding that HIV infection is an impairment per se, the court held: 
In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the 
infected person’s white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we 
hold it is an impairment from the moment of infection.  . . . HIV infection 
must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a constant and 
                                                                
125Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2204.   
126See n. 62, supra, and accompanying text. 
12742 U.S.C. § 12201(a). 
128Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2203. 
129Id. citing Greene, Medical Management of AIDS, 18-24 (M. Sande and P. Volberding 
eds., 5th ed., 1997). 
130Id. 
131Id. 
132Id. 
133Id. at 2204. 
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detrimental effect on the infected person’s hemic and lymphatic systems 
from the moment of infection.  HIV infection satisfies the statutory and 
regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the 
disease.134 
Though the legislative history of the ADA supports a finding that HIV should be 
considered an “impairment” regardless of whether the individual is symptomatic or 
asymptomatic,135 the Court did not review the legislative history in its discussion of 
the definition of “impairment.”  After finding that asymptomatic HIV was an 
impairment for purposes of the ADA, the court went on to discuss what constitutes a 
major life activity. 
B.  What are Major Life Activities? 
The first prong of the ADA’s definition of “disability” requires that an 
impairment “substantially limit one or more major life activities”136 before the 
protections of the ADA apply.  The statute is not triggered unless and until the 
claimant can show that the impairment impacts a major life activity and the degree of 
that impact raises to the level of “substantial limitation.” 
Abbott argued that the Court of Appeals correctly defined the word “major” 
when it found that the “plain meaning of the word ‘major’ denotes comparative 
importance” or “significance” and the term “life” is “notable for its breadth.”137  
Abbott further argued that the phrase “life activities” encompasses a wide, expansive 
range and array of tasks, functions and pursuits which most people would engage 
in.138  Congress could have chosen to use a narrower, more restrictive phrase such as 
“essential life activities” or “daily life activities.”  But the phrase “life activities” was 
specifically used to be broad enough to cover both the activities listed in the 
regulations139 as well as other important basic life activities. 
Abbott went on to argue that procreation, the life activity which creates life itself, 
is plainly a “major life activity.”140  Abbott pointed out that the Supreme Court has 
long recognized the importance of procreation, noting that it is “fundamental to the 
                                                                
134Id. 
135See n. 65-76 and accompanying text. 
13642 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a).  
137Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 939-940; See also Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 
F. Supp. at 1320 (finding that HIV is a disability, and noting that the “term ‘major life 
activities’ ... encompasses a lot [and includes] the various major activities embraced within the 
full scope of one’s life”). 
138See Respondent’s Brief, 1998 WL 47514 at 30. 
139Abbott argued that the list of activities set out in the regulations were not exhaustive.  
See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (“major life activities means functions such as caring for one's self, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working”) (emphasis supplied); see also, 107 F.3d at 940(8a) (noting that the regulation 
“clearly ... indicates [that the] enumeration is not meant to be exclusive ...”). 
140Respondent’s Brief, supra n. 137 at 17; See 107 F.3d at 939 (“reproduction, which is 
both the source of all life and one of life’s most important activities, easily qualifies [as a 
major life activity]”). 
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very existence and survival of the race.”141  Accordingly, an individual’s interest in 
deciding whether or not to conceive and raise children and in actually doing so is a 
fundamental liberty interest, deserving of constitutional protection.142  As Abbott 
pointed out in her brief: 
Sexual relations is one of the most basic activities which humans engage 
in and, for the most part, is the sine qua non for reproduction.  Decisions 
about sexual relations have always been fundamental to social ordering 
and lie at the heart of human relationships, intimacy, and socialization.  
Moreover, the inclusion of intimate sexual relations within the category of 
“major life activity” is consistent with the legislative history in which 
Congress specified that the term “major life activities” includes 
procreation and intimate sexual relations.  H. Rep.–2 at 52.143 
On the other hand, Bragdon argued that the focus of the ADA is on public, not 
private family life.144  Bragdon argued that the purpose of the ADA was to bring 
people into the economic and social mainstream of American life.145  Bragdon 
outlined the types of public accommodations covered under the ADA and said that 
this lengthy list of places is the “mainstream of American life” into which Title III of 
the ADA wants to bring people with disabilities.146  Arguing that persons unable to 
conceive  have no difficulty getting into this mainstream, Bragdon concluded that the 
activities of procreation and sexual intimacy are not the kind of activities that the 
ADA sought to encourage or protect.147  Citing to Krauel148 and to Zatarain,149 
                                                                
141See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
142See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).  
(fundamental liberty to make decisions about family and parenthood); Carey v. Population 
Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).  (“The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is 
at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645, 650 (1972). (unwed father’s due process right to companionship, care and custody 
of his children). 
143Respondent’s Brief, supra n.137 at 17-18. 
144Petitioner’s Brief, supra n. 122 at 14. 
145Id. at 28 citing to H. Rep. 101-485(I), 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 268 (the ADA “will permit the United States ... to welcome individuals 
with disabilities fully into the mainstream of American society”); H. Rep. 101-485(II), 101 st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (the purpose of the ADA is “to 
bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life”); H. 
Rep. 101-485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 199 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 446 (same); 
H. Rep. 101-485(IV), 101 st Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 512 
(same). 
146Petitioner’s Brief, supra n. 122 at 30. 
147Id. 
148Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996). 
149Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D.La.1995) (unlike other 
activities on the regulatory list, a person is not “called upon to reproduce throughout the day, 
every day,” and treating reproduction as a major life activity under the ADA “would be a 
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Bragdon argued that sexual activity was not performed with the kind of frequency 
and regularity that Congress intended when it used the term "major life activity."150 
The Supreme Court resolved this issue in favor of Abbott disagreeing with 
Bragdon’s arguments regarding the nature of the protections afforded by the ADA. 
In dealing with the issue of “major life activity” the Court announced that it felt 
obligated to confine itself to an analysis of whether reproduction was a major life 
activity because “[F]rom the outset . .  the case has been treated as one in which 
reproduction was the major life activity limited by the impairment.”151  However, in 
dicta, the court noted that it had “little doubt that had different parties brought the 
suit they would have maintained that an HIV infection imposes substantial 
limitations on other major life activities.152  Citing to the Court of Appeals decision,  
the court held that the definition of “major” denoted “comparative importance” 
suggesting that the standard to be used to determine whether an activity should be 
included as a major life activity is its significance.153 
Based on this standard of “significance” the court had little difficulty finding that 
reproduction is a major life activity.154  The Court found that reproduction and the 
intimate sexual relations surrounding it are central to the life process itself and 
therefore, are of the utmost significance to human survival.155  
The Court specifically disagreed with the Dr. Bragdon’s position that Congress 
intended the ADA to regulate aspects of a person’s life that were public, not private.  
As described above, Bragdon had argued that the goal of the ADA was to provide a 
“clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”156  
In addressing this public/private issue raised by Bragdon, the Court first looked 
to the ordinary definition of the word “major” and found that nothing in the 
definition that suggested that activities without a public, economic or daily 
dimension” are somehow unimportant or so insignificant as to be outside the 
meaning of the work “major.”157  The Court also reviewed the regulations to 
                                                          
conscious expansion of the law ... beyond the province of this Court”), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th 
Cir. 1996). 
150Petitioner’s Brief, supra n. 122 at 36-37. 
151Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. 
152Id.; As Respondent Abbott argued in her brief, because HIV is an infectious, incurable, 
universally fatal disease, it inevitably limits substantially an array of major life activities.  By 
setting an unexpected and premature endpoint on one’s life, a fatal illness necessarily limits 
that life, and any life activities which require thinking about the future.  Decisions about such 
matters as family, working, learning or education, even whether to buy a home, are restricted 
by the shortened nature of life itself.  Thus, even in the implausible event that an individual 
with a fatal illness experienced neither any physical or psychological effect from the illness, 
simply by shortening life, the physical impairment would substantially limit many major life 
activities.  Respondent’s Brief, supra n. 129 at 18. 
153Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 940. 
154Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. 
155Id. 
15642 U.S.C. Section 12101(b)(1) & (2). 
157Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. 
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determine if the regulations limited the meaning of the term “major” to just public 
activities.  Again, the Court found no support for a limited reading of the term 
“major.”  The Court found that the inclusion of other activities such as caring for 
one's self and performing manual tasks negate the reading that the Act only covers 
activities which are public or economic.158  The Court concluded that reproduction 
and the sexual activities surrounding it are central to life and therefore fit into the 
definition of “major life activity.” 
C.  What Constitutes Substantial Limitation? 
Even assuming that reproduction is a major life activity for purposes of the ADA, 
the protections of the ADA are not triggered until there is a showing that the major 
life activity identified has been substantially limited by the impairment alleged.  In 
this context, Abbott argued that reproduction was substantially limited because an 
HIV–positive man and an HIV–positive woman risk infecting both their sexual 
partners as well as any children they conceive.  Medical evidence revealed a 25% 
risk of transmission to the fetus by the mother without AZT treatment and an 8% risk 
to the fetus with the treatment.  According to the Abbott’s argument, even if a child 
is born uninfected, the fatal nature of HIV infection means that a parent is unlikely to 
live long enough to raise and nurture the child to adulthood.  Obviously, this impacts 
on an individual's decision as to whether or not to have a child and, if so, how to 
raise the child.  Additionally, Abbott argued even if an individual has no immediate 
plans to have children, he or she is substantially limited because future options are 
equally restricted.159  
On the other hand, Dr. Bragdon argued that HIV infection did not physically limit 
reproduction but that the decision to not have children was a lifestyle choice and not 
due to the inability to have sex and become pregnant.160  Citing to the Runnebaum 
case, Bragdon argued that an HIV positive woman, whether the infection is 
symptomatic or asymptomatic is not physically prevented from conceiving and 
having a child.161  
The Court disagreed with Bragdon’s argument and held: 
The Act addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter 
inabilities.  Conception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV 
victim but, without doubt, are dangerous to the public health.  This meets 
the definition of a substantial limitation.162 
                                                                
158Id. 
159Respondent’s Brief, supra n.137 at 22-24. 
160See Petitioner’s Brief, supra n. 114 p. 39 - 40.  “Many asymptomatic women with HIV 
decide to become pregnant and have children, and most of their children are not infected with 
HIV.  Many asymptomatic women with HIV decide not to have children.  The difference 
between them is not physical, but decisions made according to their respective moral, 
religious, and cultural values.  Physically, there is no substantial limitation on their abilities to 
reproduce, and therefore no disability under 42 U.S.C. s 12102(2)(A) . . .”  Id. p. 41. 
161Id. 
162Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2206. 
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Therefore, to satisfy the statutory standard of “substantial limitation” a claimant 
is not required to show that the major life activity is impossible to accomplish, just 
that there are substantial difficulties in doing so.  The court found two bases to 
support its opinion that reproduction and sexual relations were substantially limited 
by HIV infection.  First, there is at least a 20% risk of transmission of the HIV 
infection to male partners of women infected with the virus.163  Second, the Court 
found that the risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child, whether 
that risk is 25% without AZT therapy or 8% with the therapy, does represent a 
substantial limitation on reproduction.164 
The Court also looked to the decisions of agencies who reviewed the question of 
whether asymptomatic HIV infection was a disability under the Rehabilitation Act 
and found that without exception, “every agency to consider the issue under the 
Rehabilitation Act found statutory coverage for persons with asymptomatic HIV.”165  
Likewise the court noted that case law fully supported the finding that asymptomatic 
HIV satisfied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of a handicap.166 
Finally, the Court looked to the regulations promulgated by the Justice 
Department to implement the public accommodation provisions of Title III of the 
ADA.  The Court found that Congress directed the Justice Department to promulgate 
regulations for the enforcement of the ADA and those regulations should be given 
deference.167  As pointed out above, the Justice Department incorporated the 
definition of “handicap” verbatim from the regulatory definition under the 
Rehabilitation Act.  Additionally, the Justice Department specifically added to the 
list of impairments HIV infection whether symptomatic or asymptomatic.”168  While 
this definition defines “impairment” and not necessarily “disability,” the technical 
assistance manual promulgated by the Department of Justice “concludes that persons 
with asymptomatic HIV infection fall within the ADA’s definition of disability.”169 
The court concluded that “reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it” 
are major life activities that are substantially limited by HIV infection, whether the 
infection is symptomatic or asymptomatic. 
D.  Did Abbott Present a Direct Threat to the Health and Safety of Others? 
The final question that the Court considered was whether Dr. Bragdon had the 
right to refuse to treat Ms. Abbott because her HIV infection presented a direct threat 
to his health and safety.  Notwithstanding the protection given an individual with a 
disability pursuant to the ADA, the individual may not be protected if he or she 
poses a risk to the health of another.170  In both Title I (employment) and Title III 
                                                                
163Id. citing Osmond & Padian, Sexual Transmission of HIV, AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE 1.9-
8; Averkos & Battjes, Female to Male Transmission of HIV, 268 JAMA 1855, 1856 (1992). 
164Id.  
165Id. at 2207. 
166Id at 2208.  
167Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2209. 
168Id.; See 28 C.F.R. 36.104(1)(iii). 
169Id. 
17042 U.S.C. Section 12182(b)(3). 
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(public accommodations), direct threat is defined as a significant risk to the heath 
and safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, 
practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.171  The 
provision is based on the Supreme Court’s holding in School Board of Nassau 
County v. Arline172 and recognizes the need to balance an individual’s right to be free 
from discrimination with the public’s right to be free from significant health and 
safety risks. 
The issue is not the mere existence of a risk but the significance of the risk.173  
The risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence and must 
take into consideration certain factors set out in the regulations.  The regulations 
provide that a provider must make an individualized determination based on current 
medical knowledge “to ascertain: the nature, duration and severity of the risk; the 
probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable 
modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.”174 
In the Arline case, the Supreme Court reserved on the issue of whether courts 
should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on which an 
employer had relied.175  In Bragdon v. Abbott, Dr. Bragdon argued that a health care 
provider’s good faith belief that a direct threat exists should be sufficient to avoid 
liability and that the lower court should have deferred to his medical judgment in 
refusing to treat Ms. Abbot.  The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that 
courts should assess the objective reasonableness of the views of health care 
professionals, and not simply defer to their individual judgments. 176  The Court 
concluded that the proper course was to remand the issue of direct threat to the lower 
court to determine whether there was sufficient objective evidence to show that 
asymptomatic HIV posed a significant risk that would threaten the health or safety of 
Dr. Bragdon.177  
                                                                
171Id.; 42 U.S.C. Section 12111(3), 12113(b). 
172School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). 
173Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2210. 
17428 C.F.R. Section 36.208(c). 
175School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1131, n18. 
176Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2211. 
177The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued a ruling on remand from the Supreme 
Court in which the court concluded that Dr. Bragdon failed to meet his burden of adducing 
evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact on the significance of the risk posed by 
treating, in his office, a patient with asymptomatic HIV.  The Court was careful to limit its 
ruling to the evidence previously submitted and relied on by Dr. Bragdon.  With respect to the 
future use of the ruling as precedent, the court said:  “The state of scientific knowledge 
concerning this disease is evolving, and we caution future courts to consider carefully whether 
future litigants have been able, through scientific advances, more complete research, or special 
circumstances, to present facts and arguments warranting a different decision.”  Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. den., 1999 WL 169516 (May 24, 1999)(No. 96-
1643). 
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VI.  QUESTIONS NOT ANSWERED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
The decision in Bragdon v. Abbott provided answers to some important questions 
but left unanswered many questions that will have to be resolved by courts in the 
future.  While the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether asymptomatic HIV 
is an impairment per se, it refused to address the question it asked counsel to brief-- 
whether asymptomatic HIV is a “disability” per se.178  While the majority clearly 
held that HIV is always a physical impairment, it refused to find that it was always a 
disability.  Though the opinion suggests that HIV will usually be found to be a 
disability, the opinion makes it equally clear that courts are required to make a case-
by-case assessment of whether the HIV significantly limits a major life activity.179 
The lack of clarity provided by the ruling in Bragdon v. Abbott creates a problem 
from a public health perspective.  Public health officials have long recognized that 
the best way to fight the AIDS pandemic is through education, early testing, early 
treatment and counseling.180  The more secure a person feels about their legal 
protections, including freedom from discrimination and assurance of confidentiality, 
the more willing a person will be to submit to an HIV test to determine whether they 
are HIV positive.  The failure of the Supreme Court to clearly state that HIV is 
always a disability, means that the individual can have no guarantee of legal 
protection from discrimination.  This result may discourage persons from being 
tested if they cannot be assured that a positive result would afford them protections 
under the ADA.  Instead of making it clear that these legal protections are to be 
afforded HIV-positive persons in every case, the court requires an individualized 
case-by-case analysis to determine whether an each individual is covered by the 
ADA.  For each case, the court must determine what major life activity is effected 
and whether the HIV significantly limits participation in that activity. 
In addition, the failure to make clear that HIV is always a disability for purposes 
of the ADA, may impact an employer's decision about the nature and extent of health 
insurance benefits to be provided for HIV treatment.  The ADA prohibits employers 
from discriminating against disabled employees in terms of employee benefits 
including health and disability benefits.181  The Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission (EEOC) has consistently taken the position that health insurance plans 
that place a monetary cap on HIV treatment when other treatments are not capped is 
discriminatory under the ADA.182  Of course, this result depends on the underlying 
                                                                
178Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2207, the Court held: “Respondent’s HIV infection is a 
physical impairment which substantially limits a major life activity, as the ADA defines it.  In 
view of our holding, we need not address the second question present, i.e. whether HIV 
infection is a per se disability under the ADA.” 
179Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d at 940. 
180Gostin, Larry, A Decade of a Maturing Epidemic:  An Assessment of Directions for 
Future Public Policy, 5 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1990). 
18142 U.S.C. Section 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. 1630.4(f). 
182See e.g. EEOC v. Allied Services Division Welfare Fund, 4 NATIONAL DISABILITY LAW 
REPORTER 1 (October 27, 1993)(Settlement included employer’s agreement to rescind a 
$5,000 lifetime cap on AIDS-related treatment.); EEOC v. Connecticut Refining Co., NDLR 
(April 13, 1994)(Connecticut company entered into a conciliation agreement with EEOC 
whereby it agreed to delete the $5,000 benefit limitation relating to AIDS and AIDS-related 
treatment.); EEOC v. Tarrant Distributors, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D.Tex. 1994)(Consent 
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assumption that persons with HIV are disabled for purposes of the ADA.  If HIV is 
not always a disability, could benefits be limited or withheld for some HIV infected 
employees until they reach the later stages of the disease?  If employees at the 
earliest stage of HIV can be denied health benefits for HIV treatment, they may be 
denied critical treatment which has now been shown to prolong the life of persons 
infected with HIV.  The failure to find that HIV is a per se disability complicates the 
employer’s decision regarding the nature and extent of their obligation to provide 
health care benefits and may undermine an employee’s ability to claim the employer 
is obligated to provide health care for HIV treatment on the same basis that other 
diseases are covered. 
On one hand, the opinion helped to clarify the meaning of “major life activities” 
in that the Court clearly rejected Bragdon’s argument that “major life activities” was 
limited to basic daily activities that are done with frequency and regularity such as 
eating, breathing, and caring for oneself.  The Court also made it clear that “major 
life activities” did not only include “public” activities but rather extended to private 
activities, as well.  Finally, the Court recognized that “major” denotes activities that 
are “important” or “central” to the life process.  This ruling did not limit the kinds of 
activities that courts could consider “major” in the way Bragdon had argued that the 
term should be limited. 
The Court also clearly found that reproduction is a major life activity, a decision 
that will help HIV-positive persons in claiming the protections of the ADA and also 
may lead the way for the protection of persons seeking access to medical care for 
infertility problems. However, in finding that reproduction was a major life activity, 
the Court found that: “Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are 
central to the life process itself (emphasis added).”183  Did the court mean that having 
a sexual relationship alone is also central to the life process?  Could a claimant who 
is HIV-positive claim the protections of the ADA on the basis of being unable to 
maintain a sexual relationship because of his/her HIV disease regardless of any 
desire to reproduce?  Would a claimant who is unable to reproduce because of 
menopause still be able to claim the protections of the ADA on the basis that her 
HIV disease significantly limits her ability to have a sexual relationship? 
The opinion notes that Ms. Abbott’s testimony regarding her decision not to have 
children because of her HIV disease was important and unchallenged.  Does the 
opinion, then, imply that a claimant must show she personally had reproductive plans 
that were interfered with because of the disability?  Must a plaintiff show, not only 
that she is substantially limited in reproduction, but that reproduction is of particular 
importance to her individually?  The extent to which the claimant must show that the 
“activity” claimed is personally significant and not just significant generally remains 
unclear from this opinion. 
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion in Bragdon, points out that 
there may be many types of activities that are significantly impacted by HIV.  As he 
stated “had different parties brought the suit they would have maintained that an HIV 
infection imposes substantial limitations on other major life activities.”184  Justice 
                                                          
order whereby company agreed to eliminate a cap on AIDS benefits); EEOC v. Lee Data 
Corporation, slip op. DV 9103874 (D.Cal. 1995)(company agreed to raise cap on AIDS 
benefits from $100,000 to $1 million). 
183Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2205. 
184Id. 
206 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 14:179 
Ginsberg, who wrote a concurring opinion lists many activities that she found to be 
significantly impacted by HIV.  For example, she noted that HIV “. . . inevitably 
pervades life’s choices: education, employment, family and financial undertakings.  
It affects the need for and. . . the ability to obtain health care because of the reaction 
of others to the impairment.”185  According to Justice Ginsberg, these problems affect 
the ability of one to care for oneself, one of the definitions of “major life activity.”186  
However, it is unclear from the opinion how far the court will go in identifying 
“major life activities.”  This more universal approach to defining “major life 
activities” comes close to defining asymptomatic HIV as a disability per se since 
HIV at any stage impacts anyone infected in the ways set forth in Justice Ginsberg’s 
concurring opinion. 
Another question left open by this opinion is the question of the relevance of 
medication in lessening the impact of the effects of HIV and prolonging the life 
expectancy of the person infected.  The EEOC has long taken the position that the 
determination of disability should be made without regard to the ameliorative effects 
of medication.187  The Supreme Court recently decided three cases all involving an 
issue which had created a split in Circuit Court of Appeals opinions.  All three cases 
addressed whether the determination that an individual is disabled, within the 
meaning of the ADA, should be made with or without consideration of mitigating 
measures such as medication or assistive devices?188  In one of the cases, Murphy v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc.189 the lower court found that Murphy, a truck mechanic 
with severe hypertension, was not disabled for purposes of the ADA because he 
experienced no substantial limitation in a major life activity when his condition was 
treated with medication.190  The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision 
that Murphy was not disabled since he could function normally when his blood 
pressure was controlled by medication.191  While the Bragdon v. Abbott case 
considered medication in its analysis of perinatal transmission,192 it failed to address 
                                                                
185Id. at 2213. 
186Id. 
187EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 902.5 (March 1995). 
188Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. granted 119 S. 
Ct. 790 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. granted 
119 S. Ct. 790 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. 
granted 119 S. Ct. 791 (1999); EEOC guidelines provide that the disability determination 
should be made on a case-by-case basis without regard to mitigating measures.  The 6th and 
10th Circuits have rejected that position while the 1st, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Circuits have 
ruled that the determination must be made without considering the effects of medication or 
assistive devices.  67 U.S.L.W. 3663 (May 4, 1999). 
189Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 141 F.3d at 1192. 
190Id. 
191Id. at 2137. 
192The Court discussed the #076 clinical trials in which it was shown that certain 
treatments of AZT during the third trimester of pregnancy can reduce the transmission of HIV 
from mother to baby from approximately 25% down to 8%.  Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 
2206.  Even at 8% risk of transmission to the fetus, the court held that this risk was significant.  
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the bigger question of how the courts should assess the impact of medication in 
determining disability.  New treatments for HIV include “drug cocktails” that have 
been effective in reducing the viral load of HIV to such a minimal level as to be 
almost non-existent for some period of time.  How should the disability 
determination take into account the effect of medication on HIV disease?  Even 
though the viral load may be quite small, the risk of transmission to a partner or to a 
fetus would still substantially limit the major life activity of procreation.  
Additionally, if the “disability” determination must be made after consideration of 
the ameliorative effects of medication, it is arguable that such a holding might 
discourage some individuals from taking medication that may improve their 
condition but make them ineligible for the protections afforded under the ADA. 
Another critical question left unanswered relates to the direct threat defense 
raised by Dr. Bragdon.  As stated above, Dr. Bragdon argued that even if Ms. Abbot 
was protected under the ADA that he had a right to protect his health and safety from 
the risk her HIV infection posed for him.  The Court held that deference should be 
given to the opinions of public health officials but did not describe who qualifies as a 
public health official.  The Court suggested that the opinions of the American Dental 
Association should not be relied on because it is not a public health agency.193  
However, the Court did not elaborate as to which organizations did qualify.  The 
Court failed to elaborate as to how opinions of local, state or national health officials 
should be balanced and which one should be given greater weight in the vent of a 
disagreement between officials. 
More importantly, though, there was a failure to analyze what constitutes a 
significant risk.  Dr. Bragdon refused to treat Ms. Abbott in his office because of his 
belief that there was a risk of transmission.  In forming his opinion, he relied on his 
knowledge of seven unconfirmed cases of dental transmission of HIV plus forty-two 
cases of occupational health transmission outside of dentistry.194  In the main 
opinion, the Court found that it was unclear whether Bragdon knew that the seven 
dental cases had not been confirmed by CDC when he made his decision not to treat 
Ms. Abbott.  According to the main opinion, if Dr. Bragdon was not aware that the 
cases were unconfirmed then they may have provided some support for his refusal to 
treat.195  What was left unanswered was exactly what degree of risk would be deemed 
significant in the case of a fatal disease.  Though the main opinion points out that no 
endeavor can be expected to be risk free, it still fails to elaborate what constitutes a 
“significant” risk.  Since HIV is a fatal disease, does any probability of transmission, 
no matter how remote, constitute “significant risk” since the transmission would 
surely result in death?  If that were the rule applied by courts, the protections 
afforded under the ADA to persons infected with HIV would be greatly undermined. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
While the Bragdon v. Abbott decision resolved some issues and made clear that 
reproduction is a major life activity for purposes of the Americans With Disabilities 
                                                          
“It cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to 
one’s child does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction.”  Id. 
193Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2212. 
194Id. at 2217. 
195Id. at 2212. 
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Act, many questions were left unanswered and unresolved.  The court failed to 
directly address whether HIV disease is a disability per se.  It failed to address what 
the role of public health officials should be or what probability of risk constitutes a 
“significant risk.” 
As Justice Ginsberg noted in her concurring opinion, the third prong of the 
definition of disability, that the individual is perceived as having a disability, may be 
the real basis for a finding that HIV is per se a disability.196  As discussed above, the 
third definition of the word “disability” is designed to protect individuals from the 
myths and fears associated with disabilities.  A person is protected if the individual 
has an impairment and is treated as if he or she has a substantial limitation even 
though there is no limitation or the limitation exists because of the attitudes of others 
toward the individual with the impairment.  Although the parties briefed the meaning 
of this third definition, the court did not consider its application in Bragdon v. 
Abbott.  By not considering it, the court did not address whether the negative 
treatment that people experience is, in fact, the essence of what defines a disability in 
order to trigger the protections against discrimination for people with disabilities. 
 
                                                                
196Id. at 2214. 
